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Machine learning has seen tremendous advances in the past few years, which has lead to deep learning
models being deployed in varied applications of day-to-day life. Attacks on such models using perturbations,
particularly in real-life scenarios, pose a severe challenge to their applicability, pushing research into the
direction which aims to enhance the robustness of these models. After the introduction of these perturbations
by Szegedy et al. [1], significant amount of research has focused on the reliability of such models, primarily in
two aspects - white-box, where the adversary has access to the targeted model and related parameters; and
the black-box, which resembles a real-life scenario with the adversary having almost no knowledge of the
model to be attacked. To provide a comprehensive security cover, it is essential to identify, study, and build
defenses against such attacks. Hence, in this paper, we propose to present a comprehensive comparative study
of various black-box adversarial attacks and defense techniques.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine Learning (ML) is the most influential field in the sciences today. With applications in
Computer Science, Biomedical Engineering, Finance, and Law leveraging the edge in Language,
Vision, Audio with specialized branches like Deep Learning (DL), Reinforcement Learning (RL) the
involvement of ML in day-to-day life is undeniable. RL models are beating world champions at their
own game; DL models can classify a multitude of categories with precise identification of species,
objects, material, which is humanly impossible. The field has grown so much that Deep Language
models are writing fiction, news reports, and poetry at the same time. While the developments in
the area are exciting, the underlying techniques are probabilistic, making the performance of an
ML model highly dependent on the training data.
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2 Bhambri & Muku, et al.
Gaps in the training data have lead to biased models, a biased model can have excellent perfor-
mance on a set of inputs closer to the training data, but it fails on corner cases where the input
was rarely seen while training. Whatever be the domain, an ML model draws boundaries between
classes in an n dimensional space, and these decision boundaries can not be reasoned. Sometimes
these boundaries can be subtle, making the model categorize inputs into different classes (with
high confidence scores) in the immediate neighborhood of a boundary. Taking advantage of these
traits in ML, to fool the system into wrongly interpreting an input, Adversarial attacks are crafted.
A typical adversarial attack starts with studying the model, inputs, outputs, training data, model
parameters, etc. according to the threat model. While earlier threat models were surrounded around
the training data and complete access to the model parameters, it is less practical in the sense that
the attacker can be an outsider. The black-box adversarial attack, on the other hand, limits the
attacker’s capabilities, with access only to the deployed model, sometimes restrictions are also put
on the observable parameters of the model. The setting of black-box attacks and constraints on
attacker are closer to the real-world scenario.
To understand the Adversarial attacks in the context of Black-box in this section, we introduce
the Taxonomy.
1.1 Taxonomy
Here we introduce the key concepts in the context of the adversarial attacks.
• Adversary: An entity trying to attack the ML model to classify a legitimate-looking input
wrongly. Say input i ∈ c , where c is the original class, the Adversary’s goal is to make the
model predict an input i‘ ∈ c‘, where i‘ is the input adversary carefully crafts and the point
to note is i‘ will still be classified as c for a human annotator.
• Perturbation: To achieve the above mentioned goals, the adversary crafts an input i‘ which
is perturbed from i by adding an impurity say δ Ûϵ . Modified input i‘ = i + δ Ûϵ is called the
perturbed input. Constraints on the perturbation are a challenge to the Adversary. Any
changes made should be under a certain value, to make sure that the input is still classified
into its original class c by a human annotator. L2 distance is often used in literature to define
the acceptable impurity.
• Adversarial Input: Input crafted by Adversary after perturbation is called Adversarial
Input. The key properties of this input are the impurity and actual input. The addition of
this impurity makes the actual input "jump the classification boundary," hence the model
misclassifies an Adversarial Input.
• Targeted Attack:When the target misclassified class c‘ of a perturbed input i‘ is defined,
then it is a Targeted Attack. Here, the adversary targets the impurity in such a way that the
model classifies given input i to class c‘.
• Query: A query is counted as a single instance of sending input to the model under attack
and noting the observations made. Minimizing the number of queries made reduces the time
taken to build an adversarial example, hence it is a key aspect of building efficient adversary
models.
• ThreatModel: Threat model defines the rules of the attack, what resources can the adversary
use, and the end goal of the attack. Two main components are described below:
– Attacker Goals: Goals define what the adversarial input seeks from the attack. Various
security goals such as integrity attack, availability attack, targeted attack, exploratory
attack come under goals. An attacker can attempt a single goal or multiple at a given time.
– Attacker Capabilities: Information at adversary’s disposal like the training data (with
or without labels), model parameters, number of queries adversary can make come under
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capabilities of the attacker. Also, training time attack and post-training attack are other
aspects in which the attacker’s capabilities are defined.
• White-box Attack: In a white-box attack, the adversary knows everything about the target
model. The knowledge of the adversary includes the learned weights, parameters used to tune
the model. Labeled training data is also available in some cases. With this information, the
usual strategy of the attacker is to model the distribution from weights and derive perturbed
inputs to violate the boundaries while being in the L2 limits.
• Black-box Attack: Contrast to white-box attacks, a black-box attack has limited knowledge
of the model, with no labeled data sometimes. An attack with black-box constraints is often
modeled around querying the model on inputs, observing the labels or confidence scores.
• Transferability: It refers to the occasion of using a model trained on one the same of data,
by observing inputs and outputs (querying) of the original model called "substitute model,"
and using the perturbed inputs from this model to attack the original "target model." The
assumption here is that the substitute model simulates the target model.
1.2 Related Surveys - How is our survey different?
In an early work [2], the authors introduced the now-standard taxonomy of Adversarial attacks in
Machine Learning; the survey gave a structure to the interaction between attacker and defender. By
fitting the existing adversarial attacks into this threat model, authors generalized on the principles
involved in the security of Machine Learning. Another significant contribution of the work is a
line of defenses to Adversarial attacks that the authors presented based on their taxonomy. The
work [3] also generalized and standardized the job done in this domain.
As the adversarial attacks became more frequent, later surveys in the field concentrated in
specifics of the domain. [4] is an extensive survey on attacks in Computer Vision with Deep
Learning, [5] gave a data-driven view of the same, and [6] studied the fundamental security policy
violations in adversarial attacks.
As mentioned in Section 1, Black Box adversarial attacks are more close to real life, and a lot of
work is being carried out in this domain. However, extensive and informative the surveys above
have been, there is a lack of study exclusive to Black Box attacks. With this work, we want to survey
the existing benchmark Black Box attacks on different domains. We also address how each of the
areas like Computer Vision, NLP differ in terms of robustness towards attack and the challenges in
approaching these models. Table 1 shows a list of works we discuss in this paper, discussing the
milestone contributions in the Black Box Adversarial space.
1.3 Why Black-Box Attacks?
While black-box attacks limit the capabilities of the attacker, they are more practical. In a general
sense, security attacks are carried out on full-grown and deployed systems. Attacks with intent to
circumvent a system, disable a system, compromise the integrity are seen in the real world.
Consideration of two parties, adversary and challenger, is possible in this paradigm. Challenger
being the party that trains a model and deploys and adversary being the attacker whose intention is
to break the system for a predefined goal. Multiple capability configurations that reflect real-world
behavior are possible in this setting. As an example, if a robber evading from the crime scene wants
to fool the surveillance system into tagging a different car number, or a criminal targeting the
prey’s car number getting tagged are configuration changes to adversarial user goals. However, the
system under attack in this example is owned by a third party. Neither the robber nor the criminal
was part of the development of the surveillance system.
The limited capabilities of the adversary are just a reflection of real-world scenarios. Hence,
works in this domain are more practical.
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1.4 Evaluation of Attack
Adversarial attacks, in general, are evaluated based on the number of queries made on the model to
converge on parameters. Lesser the number of queries better will be the attack, as the time taken
to start an attack will be minimized. Apart from the time taken to craft an attack, the perturbation
norm is a standard measure of determining the effectiveness of an attack. Borrowed from Machine
Learning literature, the most common perturbation norms in use are l2 and l∞, which are standard
error measures.
• l2 norm: Also called as Euclidean norm, l2 is the shortest distance between two vectors. In
the adversarial setting, the distance from the original input i and the perturbed input i‘ is
calculated. To maintain the distance at minimum, the goal is to change an input i in a way
indistinguishable by a human annotator.
• l∞ norm: It is the highest entry in the vector space. l∞ essentially determines the maximum
value in the vector given.
2 BLACK-BOX VS WHITE-BOX
As discussed in Section 1.1, resources with an adversary differ considerably based on the type of
attack model. In a white-box attack, an adversary can have full access to the model right from the
start of training, which leads to the availability of training data, testing data, network architecture,
parameters, and finally, the learned weights of a model, etc. Also, the number of queries an adversary
can make comes under resources. For example, in a one-shot adversarial attack, the attacker has
only a single shot at fooling the model; in such cases crafting the adversarial example does not
involve a fine-tuning step.
When it comes to black-box attacks, the resources with adversary are considerably less. For one,
the adversary will have no access to the model in the training phase, nor the adversary knows
weights and parameters used in the model. However, once the model is deployed, based on the type
of attack, the probability of each predicted label will be provided to the adversary. A stricter case
is where only the predicted label is known to the attacker without any confidence score. Varying
degree of information like labeled dataset is provided to adversaries in specific threat models. Again,
as said above, the number of queries an attacker can make while crafting an adversarial example
is considered under resources. An attack is deemed to be superior if the amount of resources
consumed is minimal.
3 CRAFTING A BLACK-BOX ATTACK
A Black Box adversarial example starts with evaluating access to the resources at the attacker’s
disposal. These include the kind of model, any model related parameters such as confidence scores,
test set, training dataset, etc. Once the resources are in place. An attack is carried out in one of the
following ways. Using a transferable attack strategy, the adversary can choose to train a parallel
model called a substitute model to emulate the original model. The attacker can use a much
superior architecture than the original for the weight estimation. However, in the absence of a
substitute model, the attacker chooses to have a Query Feedback mechanism, where attacker
continuously crafts the perturbed input while querying on the model under attack.
As mentioned earlier, when a network’s architecture and model weights are unknown, which is
the case with black-box adversarial attacks, it is common to practice for attackers to train another
model from scratch, called a substitute model intending to emulate the model under attack. Once
the substitute model with an attacker has achieved satisfactory accuracy, by examining the weights,
adversarial examples are crafted. As the perturbed inputs start misclassified by the model at the
attacker’s hand, these inputs are used on the actual model to achieve the adversarial goals. The
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Month Year Method Proposed Approach
Feb 2016 Papernot et al. [7] Local substitute model
Dec 2016 Narodytska et al. [8] Gradient-free
Jul 2017 Narodytska et al. [9] Advanced Local Search
Nov 2017 Chen et al. [10] ZOO
Feb 2018 Brendel et al. [11] Boundary Attack
Jul 2018 Ilyas et al. [12] Limited Queries and Info
Jul 2018 Cheng et al. [13] Opt-Attack
Oct 2018 Bhagoji et al. [14] Query Reduction using Finite Differences
Oct 2018 Du et al. [15] Attack using Gray Images
Jan 2019 Tu et al. [16] AutoZOOM
Apr 2019 Shi et al. [17] Curls & Whey
Apr 2019 Dong et al. [18] Translation-Invariant
May 2019 Chen et al. [19] POBA-GA
May 2019 Brunner et al. [20] Biased Sampling
May 2019 Li et al. [21] NATTACK
May 2019 Moon et al. [22] Combinatorial Optimization
May 2019 Ilyas et al. [23] Bandits &Priors
Jul 2019 Alzantot et al. [24] GenAttacks
Aug 2019 Guo et al. [25] SimBA
Table 1. A comparison of works that have focused on black-box scenarios in an adversarial setting.
choice for a substitute model is usually kept at a much superior level to understand the latent space
with superior contrast. As the adversary has much control and knowledge of the task at hand, this
is the choice for one-shot and targeted adversarial attacks. To put it in a sentence: transferring
the learned weights by continuous querying, and strategically attacking the model comes under
transferable attacks.
Adversarial attacks without using a substitute model pose the challenge of identifying the
boundaries, crafting the perturbed input at a manual level. Rather than training a model and then
examining the weights, this kind of attack is more hands-on and simultaneous. The attack takes a
query feedback form, where the attacker starts with random input and starts adding noise to the
input under the acceptable perturbation error level. As the confidence score of input deteriorates,
the attacker further pushes the noise in the direction of the noise, more like following the gradient.
In some cases, gradient descent itself is used to mark the direction and track the movement of
noise in the right direction. Also termed as local search, the technique boils down to searching the
correct dimension in the latent space to get a misclassified input. A detailed discussion of attacks
following both the substitute model and query feedback mechanism has been the pillar of black-box
adversarial attacks. Beginning with a classification flowchart, the following section discusses the
same in greater detail.
4 BLACK-BOX ATTACKS IN COMPUTER VISION
This section provides a detailed discussion of recent and essential works in the black-box adversarial
attacks domain. In this section, we cover the dataset used, key contributions, loss function used to
calculate perturbations, and other relevant learnings from each of the discussed research works.
4.0.1 Popular Image data sets. The most frequently used datasets to demonstrate adversarial
attacks are as follows:
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Black-Box Adversarial Attacks
Gradient Estimation Transferability Local Search Combinatorics
Classification of prior work on black-box scenario-based attacks.
• Chen et al. [10]
• Ilyas et al. [12]
• Cheng et al. [13]
• Bhagoji et al. [14]
• Du et al. [15]
• Tu et al. [16]
• Ilyas et al. [23]
• Papernot et al. [7]
• Shi et al. [17]
• Dong et al. [18]
• Narodytska et al. [8]
• Narodytska et al. [9]
• Brendel et al. [11]
• Chen et al. [19]
• Brunner et al. [20]
• Li et al. [21]
• Alzantot et al. [24]
• Guo et al. [25]
•Moon et al. [22]
• MNIST [26]: The dataset includes grayscale handwritten digits of dimensions 28x28. The
dataset consists of 60,000 training examples and 10,000 test examples.
• CIFAR 10 [27]: The dataset includes 60,000 RGB images of dimensions 32x32. There are ten
classes and 6000 images per class. The train test division consists of 50,000 training images
and 10,000 test images.
• ImageNet [28]: ImageNet is a large scale dataset consisting of 14,197,122 images. It is de-
scribed using synsets similar to WordNet. There are more than 20,000 categories that have
been annotated using more than 100,000 synset categories from WordNet.
4.1 Attack Techniques
4.1.1 Gradient Estimation.
• ZOO: Chen et al. [10] proposed Zeroth Order Optimization(ZOO) to estimate the gradients
of target DNN in order to produce an adversarial image. The threat model assumed by the
authors is that the target model can only be queried to obtain the probability scores of all the
classes. The loss function formulated is:
ForTarдetedAttack : f (x , t) =max{maxi,t loд[F (x)]i − loд[F (x)]t ,−k} (1)
ForUntarдetedAttack : f (x) = {loд[F (x)]t0 −maxi,t0loд[F (x)]i ,−k} (2)
The author then uses symmetric difference quotient method to estimate the gradient ∂f (x )∂xi :
дˆ := ∂ f (x)
∂xi
≈ f (x + hei ) − f (x − hei )2h (3)
The above naive solution requires querying the model 2p times, where p is the dimension of
the input. So the author proposes two stochastic coordinate methods: ZOO-Adam and ZOO-
Newton in which a gradient is estimated for a random coordinate and the update formula is
obtained using ADAM [29] and Newton’s Method until it reaches convergence. The authors
also discuss the generation of noise in a lower dimension to improve efficiency and specify
its advantages and disadvantages.
• Limited Queries & Information: The authors in [12] take three primary cases into account
to devise successful black-box adversarial attacks. The first case talks about the constraint of
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limited queries that can be made to the model by the adversary. This could again be of two
types- one that contains a time limit and the other that is concerned with the monetary limit.
The authors present a variant of Natural Evolution Strategies(NES) coupled with Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD), as used in white-box attacks, to construct adversarial examples.
The second case is modeled around the constraint of a partial-information setting where the
adversary can obtain confidence scores of the first k classes for a given input. These scores
may not add up to 1 since the adversary doesn’t have access to the probabilities for each
possible classification label. To tackle this scenario, instead of beginning with the input image
x , it is recommended to begin with xo belonging to the target adversarial class yadv . Hence,
after each step, we need to ensure two things-
– The target adversarial class needs to remain in the top-k classes at all points in time when
the input image is being perturbed.
ϵt =min ϵ
′ s .t . rank
(
yadv |
∏
ϵ ′
(x (t−1))) < k (4)
– The probability of the input image getting classified as the target class increases with every
iteration of PGD.
x (t ) = arд max
x ′
P
(
yadv |
∏
ϵt−1
(x ′)) (5)
Lastly, in the third scenario, the adversary is not given any confidence scores. Instead, the
adversary can only obtain the names of the classification labels for the given input data. The
authors define a discretized score R(x t ) for an adversarial example to quantitatively represent
the adversarial nature of the input image at each step t , with access only to the top −k sorted
labels.
The proposed approach was evaluated on the InceptionV3 network with 78% top − 1 accuracy
and also on Google Cloud Vision (GCV) API, which presents a real-world scenario to perform
an adversarial attack. 90% and above accuracy is achieved for all three settings when the
InceptionV3 network is attacked in the techniques mentioned above.
• Opt-Attack: Cheng et al. [13] attempt to devise a black box adversarial attack in a much
stricter hard-label setting. This means that querying the target model gives only the target
label, unlike other threat models whereK-class probability scores or labels are considered. The
authors make the attack query-efficient by treating the problem as a real-valued, continuous
optimization problem.
The objective function proposed by them is as follows:
UntarдetedAttack : д(θ ) =minλ>0 λ s .t f (x0 + λ ∗ θ| |θ | | ) , y0 (6)
TarдetedAttack(дiventarдett) : д(θ ) =minλ>0 λ s .t f (x0 + λ ∗ θ| |θ | | ) = t (7)
Here θ is the search direction and д(θ ) is the distance from the input image x0 to the closest
adversarial example in direction θ . Chen et. al. uses θ ∗ = arдminθ д(θ ) to obtain x∗ =
x0 + д(θ ∗) ∗ θ| |θ | | by using a coarse grained search to initially find a decision boundary and
then fine tuning the solution using Binary Search. The optimization problem proposed above
is solved using Randomized Gradient Free (RGF) Method, which is an iterative Zeroth Order
Optimization(ZOO) Method in which the small increment value ut is sampled randomly
from a Gaussian Distribution.
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• Query Reduction using Finite Differences: Finite Differences method was used to esti-
mate the gradient in the case of black-box attacks where no knowledge regarding the gradient
of the loss function exists. The authors in [14] propose a two-sided gradient estimation for a
function f (x), where x ∈ Rd .
The loss function used in this scenario is based on logit, which was proved to work well in
the white-box attacks [30]. The logit loss is given by:
l(x ,y) = ϕ(x + δ )y − max {ϕ(x + δ )i : i , y} (8)
where y represents the actual label for a given sample x and ϕ(.) are the logits. By taking the
logarithm of the SoftMax probabilities, the logit values can be computed up to an additive
constant. This additive constant gets canceled out because the difference in the logits is equal
to the loss function. Hence, the proposed method of using Finite Differences can be used to
calculate the difference between the logit values of the actual label y and the next most likely
label y ′.
A drawback to this naïve approach is that the model is required to make O(d) queries per
input, where d is the dimensions of input. Authors have further proposed two query reduction
techniques based on grouping the features. The first approach is based on a random selection
of features and grouping them, which will allow for simultaneous gradient estimation for
the selected features. The second approach is more technical since it involves computing
directional derivatives along with the principal components as determined by principal
component analysis (PCA).
The proposed approach was evaluated on two data sets - MNIST and CIFAR-10. Two models,
one with two convolutional layers attached to a fully connected layer and another with three
convolutional layers. These models were trained on the MNIST dataset. On the other hand,
ResNet-32 and ResNet-28-10 models were used for training in the case of the CIFAR-10 data
set.
The conclusion obtained from this approach is that the effectiveness of the crafted adversarial
examples can be reduced by modifying the model output probabilities on which Gradient
Estimation attacks are hugely dependent on.
• Attack using Gray Images: A completely new approach was followed in [15] to generate
black-box adversarial examples by initializing the adversarial sample from a gray image.
This is followed by the fact that the adversary doesn’t have access to any natural input. This
methodology begins by initializing the input for the target model with normalized pixel
values within [0,1]. Hence, the adversary now has more flexibility in adding perturbation to
the image by either increasing the pixel value to 1 to make it brighter or decreasing the pixel
value to 0 to make it darker.
Then the authors have defined the fitness function in this approach as:
J (θ ) = P(y ′ |θ ) ≈ [F (θ )]y′ (9)
The objective here is to maximize the probability term given in the fitness function until
the input image gets classified into another class y’. Similar to many other approaches, the
authors have preferred to adopt NES optimization. Here θ represents the perturbed input,
and Gaussian search distribution has been chosen given the fact that it provides a more
straightforward method of estimating the gradient where the two parameters that need to be
optimized are mean ϕd and variance σdxd .
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An important point to be noted in this approach is that this is a region-based attack algorithm,
which implies that the gradients are dependent on the region space. Evaluation of gradients
is then followed by performing a projected gradient ascent similar to the approach in [12, 31].
Input update can be shown as:
x t =
∏
[0,1]
(x t−1 + λsiдn(дt (h,w))) (10)
Where gamma represents the learning rate, and π[0,1] represents the projection operator,
which clips the values of the pixel in the range [0,1]. The search gradients are used to update
the image iteratively until the goal is achieved.
• AutoZOOM: Tu et al. [16] proposed the framework AutoZOOM, which is short for Au-
toencoder based Zeroth Order Optimization, for crafting efficient Black Box Attacks. The
two main contributions of this approach were: (i) an adaptive random gradient estimation
method for stabilizing query counts and distortion and (ii) an autoencoder trained offline on
unlabelled data or a simple Bilinear Image Resizer(BiLIN) to expedite the attack process.
The optimization problem formulated by Tu et al. [16]:
minx ∈[0,1]dDist(x ,x0) + λ.Loss(x ,M(F (x)), t) (11)
where Dist(x ,x0) = | |x − x0 | |p , F (x) : [0, 1]d → RK ,M(.) is the monotonic function applied
on classifier outputs, Loss(.) is the attack objective reflecting the likelihood of predicting
t = arдmaxk ∈{1,2, ...K }[M(F (x))]k and λ is the regularization constant. Loss function can be
both either training loss of DNN or C&W Loss [32].
Inspired by the convergence of Symmetric Difference Quotient Method [33] and taking query
efficiency into consideration, the authors proposed a scaled random full gradient estimator
of ∇f (x), defined as:
g = b .
f (x + βu) − f (x)
β
.u (12)
To control error in gradient estimation, an average is taken over q random directions:
g¯ =
1
q
q∑
j=1
gj (13)
They have also proven that l2 distance between д¯ and ∇f (x) is constrained by an upper
bound:
E||д¯ − ∇f (x)| |22 ≤4(
b2
d2
+
b2
dq
+
(b − d)2
d2
)| |∇f (x)| |22 +
2q + 1
q
b2β2L2 (14)
The above upper bound is minimum when b ≈ q. They also mention that the convergence
rate of zero order gradient descent methods is O(
√
d
T ) [34–36] and so it is plausible to
generate perturbation from a lower dimension. In AutoZOOM, random gradient estimation is
performed from a lower dimension d ′ < d in order to improve query efficiency. A decoder,D :
Rd ′ → Rd is used to add noise such that: x = x0 + D(δ ′) where δ ′ ∈ Rd ′ . Initially q = 1 but
with each iteration q is increased in order to get more accurate estimation.
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• Bandits & Priors: Ilyas et al. [23] successfully exploited prior information about the gradient
using bandit optimization. Two key observations can meet the challenge of obtaining prior
information about the gradient:-
– The input data point for which gradient computation is carried out is not arbitrary, and its
structure is predictable and also reflected in the gradient.
– Heavy correlation can be found among the gradients that are used in successive iterations
while performing iterative gradient attacks (e.g., PGD).
Two categories of priors, namely- time-dependent priors and data-dependent priors, have
been introduced, which significantly helped in performing improved black-box adversarial
attacks. The value of cosine similarity at each optimization step between successive gradients
proves the correlation between them. Hence, the authors used the gradient at time t − 1 as a
prior for the gradient calculation at time t .〈 ▽x L(xt ,y),▽xL(xt+1,y)〉▽xL(xt ,y)2▽xL(xt+1,y)2 t ∈ {1...T − 1} (15)
On the other hand, an analogy to the correlation between pixel values of an image has been
made to understand the relationship between gradients for two close coordinates. Hence, the
structure of the input data point can also be used to reduce the query complexity.
Untargeted adversarial examples have been crafted by considering both l2 and l∞ norm-based
threat models on the ImageNet data set. The approach experimented on three classifiers-
Inception-v3, ResNet-50 and VGG16. An average of 1117 queries was required in the case
of the proposed approach that made use of bandit optimization along with time and data-
dependent priors as compared to about 1735 queries in the simple case of NES. Attack failure
rate was decreased from 22.2% in l2 and 34% in l∞ for NES to 4.6% in l2 and 15.5% in L∞ for
the Bandit approach.
4.1.2 Transferability.
• Local Substitute Model: In [7], the targeted deep learning model O , also known as the
oracle, was used to construct a synthetic data set. Labels for this synthetically crafted input
data were obtained by querying the oracle O itself. This assists the attacker to create an
approximation F of the target model O . The concept of transferability allows the attacker
to ensure that O will also misclassify the input images misclassified by the approximated
model F . The primary challenge faced by the attacker in this approach is to train the model
F without any prior knowledge of the architecture O . Constraint on the number of times
the attacker can query the model O was a limitation as well. To overcome this problem, the
authors propose Jacobian-based Dataset Augmentation, which helps in approximating the
decision boundaries with limited queries.
Authors proposed a five-step approach, as listed below:
(1) The attacker collects a small set So , which represents the entire set of inputs S to the oracle.
For example, a limited number of input images, say k from every class will be obtained.
(2) Then, a suitable architecture is decided upon that can be used to train the approximation
model F . It is shown that the number, size, and type of layers do not determine a successful
attack.
(3) The substitute model is trained by repetitively applying the following steps-
(a) Model F queries the oracle model O for each of the samples ®x ∈ Sp , where Sp is the
training set available to the substitute the model.
(b) Approximated model is then trained by the attacker using the available training set Sp .
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(c) Apply the augmentation technique on the training set Sp available with the model F and
use it to generate new synthetic data points. This results in an even larger training data
set Sp+1, which is a better representative of the decision boundaries of the target model.
The augmentation technique proposed, i.e., the Jacobian-based Dataset Augmentation is
formulated as:
Sp+1 = {®x + λ · sдn(JF [Oˇ(®x)] : ®x ∈ Sp )} ∪ Sp (16)
where, λ is the step-size taken during augmentation to create the set SP+1 from the initial
available training set Sp .
• Curls &Whey: The authors in [17] aim to enhance the diversity as well as transferability of
adversarial examples in the case of black-box attacks. Their approach consists of two steps.
The first step proposed deals with the problem of adding noises/perturbation to an input
sample monotonically along the gradient ascent’s direction using Curl’s iteration. In contrast,
the second step deals with the issue of removing excessive redundant noises from the crafted
adversarial examples using Whey optimization. The proposed methodology can be better
understood through [17].
The methodology aims to push the input data point x from the current class to a different
class with which it shares its decision boundary. To perform the same operation, noise may
be added to this data point monotonically along the direction of gradient ascent. However,
the authors propose a shortcut to reach a nearer point that is present across the decision
boundary. They suggest to initially follow the direction of the gradient descent and reach the
’valley floor’ and then perform iterations to climb up the gradient. This is known as the Curl’s
iteration. Noise refinement mechanisms are followed after and before the Curl’s iteration,
respectively, which has been defined as Whey optimization.
• Translation-Invariant: This attack [18] method makes use of an ensemble of images rather
than aiming to optimize the objective function. The calculation of the gradient makes use of
the assumption that convolutional neural networks possess the translation-invariant property.
Hence, the authors propose to shift the original input image by a limited number of pixels
(10, in this case) in a 2-dimensional space.
The proposed method can be integrated with any of the gradient-based attacks which include
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [37], Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [38], Momentum
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (MI-FGSM) [39], Diverse Inputs Method [40] and Carlini
& Wagner’s Method (C&W) [32]. Experiments have been shown by the integration of the
translation-invariant property with the FGSM attack where the update rule can be stated as:
xadv = xr eal + ϵ Ûsiдn(W ∗ ▽x J (xr eal ,y)) (17)
Where the notations have the usual meanings as described in [37].
4.1.3 Local Search.
• Gradient-free Authors in [8] propose an adversarial attack methodology based on the
concept of greedy local-search technique. Their proposed algorithm perturbs an image by
choosing the most relevant pixels of the image to which noise is added. The observed change
by adding this noise in each iteration is used to approximate the loss function’s gradient.
The importance of the pixels can be understood in this step by observing the change in
classification accuracy after each round.
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The most important contribution of this work is the creation of the neighboring images to a
given input image. This neighborhood will consist of all images that are different from the
previous round’s image by one pixel only. Initially, a pixel location is randomly selected, and
perturbation is added to it. The next pixel location is chosen among all the pixels that lie
within a square whose side length is 2p, and the center is the previous pixel location, where
p is an arbitrary parameter.
The authors have focused on k −misclassi f ication, where the correct label for an image
should not be enlisted in the top-k classes predicted by the model. As soon as the target
model can push the right class out of the top-k classes, no more noise is added to the image,
and the algorithm gets terminated. The local search technique adopted is modified to increase
the classification score of the targeted class in each round, in the case of targeted attacks.
• Advanced Local Search: Local search technique is a commonly used incomplete search
algorithm used to solve problems on combinatorics. In [9], the authors have used this strategy
over the image space to construct an approximated network gradient. The objective function
is to minimize the probability that the perturbed image does not share the classification label
with the original image. The cost function defined is-
fc(I )(Iˆ ) = oc(I ) (18)
where NN (Iˆ ) = (o1, ...,oC ), in which NN is the target neural network model and oj represents
the probability of image Iˆ belonging to class j . This function is minimized by the local search
technique.
The next step in the formulation is to create a set of images that can act as neighbors of
the original image. The authors have defined these neighbor images with the help of pixel
locations since images generated after a single iteration differ only in one pixel from the
previous image. Consider the pixels that were perturbed in the last round. Hence, in the
current round, all those pixels that lie in a square of side length 2d with the perturbed pixel
at its center will be considered. Here, d is only a parameter.
In the last step, a function д has been defined as the transformation function, which generates
a new image Iˆi after every round i by adding perturbation to a set of pixels only.
• Boundary Attack: Decision-based [11] adversarial attacks that are based on a model’s final
decision, i.e., class labels or transcribed sentences, are more common in real-life scenarios
as compared to confidence score-based attacks. The authors also argue that these attacks
are more robust to defense techniques such as gradient masking, intrinsic stochasticity, or
vigorous training. Also, lesser information regarding the targeted model is required to conduct
a successful attack. This was the first time that decision-based attacks were introduced that
focus on deep learning models using real-life data sets such as ImageNet.
The proposed algorithm initializes by taking a random distribution of pixels for an image
in the range of [0, 255]. Using this image, the algorithm traverses the decision boundary of
the class to which the sample input image belongs to. The initialized image is then able to
reduce its distance w.r.t. the input image besides staying inside the adversarial region.
• POBA-GA: Chen et al. [19] proposed three parameters to be used to generate different
perturbations- different noise point pixel thresholds, number of noise points, and noise point
size. The next step is to add this noise to the first adversarial example to generate the next
generation of the population. For evaluation purposes, a fitness function ϕ is defined, followed
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by checking if the adversary has satisfied the termination condition or not. Lastly, to generate
the next set of the population for optimizing the perturbation, the suggested approach follows
the typical operations of a genetic algorithm, i.e., selection, crossover, and mutation.
The importance of the proposed fitness function is that it helps to evaluate how useful the
adversarial input is at a given iteration. Hence, the convergence of the model largely depends
on this function. The authors have incorporated two critical qualities of adversarial images
into the definition of the proposed function which are
ϕ(ASti ) = P(ASti ) −
α
maxZ (A0)Z (A
t
i ) (19)
where the left-hand side of the equation represents the fitness function for Adversarial Sample
i , (ASi ) is the probability term which accounts for the effectiveness of the attack for the
sample to get misclassified and Z (Ati ) is a metric originally proposed in this methodology to
account for the perturbation introduced. α is used as a parameter to control the proportion
for the fitness function between attack performance and the perturbation size. To reduce the
number of queries to the target model, alpha is initially taken as zero and later assigned a
value when the attack is successful. The fitness function finally looks like-
ϕ(ASti ) =
{
p(y1 |ASti ) − p(y0 |ASti ) − αmaxZ (At0 )Z (Ati ) y1 , y0
p(y2 |ASti ) − p(y0 |ASti ) y1 = y0
(20)
• Biased Sampling: The authors in [20] adopt a unique approach to introduce perturbations
for creating adversarial samples known as Perlin Noise [41]. This method was originally
used to generate procedural texture patterns for computer graphics but can also be used to
develop parametrized patterns having low-frequency. In the case of an original Boundary
Attack [11], an orthogonal perturbation ηk is applied along with a hyper-spherical surface
present around the original image. However, Perlin noise distribution is used to create a
sample to introduce a low-frequency before the Boundary Attack. Usually, a permutation
vector v with a size of 256 is used to parametrize the noise. The noise patterns are sampled
in two directions- along with the height and width of the image due to which the patters get
strongly concentrated in the directions of low-frequency.
Image masking has been performed to calculate the difference between the pixel values of
the original image and the adversarial image and can be shown as:
M =
Xadv − Xor iд  (21)
This calculation is performed after every step and applied on every single element of the
orthogonal perturbation ηk that was sampled previously.
ηkbiased = M ⊙ ηk ; ηkbiased =
ηkbiasedηkbiased (22)
Hence, the distortion of only the pixels with a considerable difference value is increased, and
it remains the same for the remaining pixels, further reducing the search space effectively.
• N-Attack: A black box adversarial attack has been proposed in [21], which tries to learn
the probability density over a small region (lp ball) centered around the input such that a
sample drawn from the density is likely an adversarial image. Their work is similar to Ilyas
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et al. [12] who have employed the loss function: f (x ′) := −F (x ′)y . They have argued that
Ilyas et al.’s [12] algorithm is inferior as it relies on accurate estimation of gradients, which is
not possible when DNN is non-smooth. For estimating gradients ∇f (xt ) with derivative-free
methods the authors have also used NES [42].
The smooth optimization criteria proposed by the authors is:
minθ J (θ ) :=
∫
f (x ′)πS (x ′ |θ )dx ′ (23)
where f (x ′) is the C&W Loss [32], πS (x ′ |θ ) is the probability density in region S (lp ball)
i.e | |x ′ − x | |p ≤ ϵ and also dim(θ ) << dim(x). The authors reformulated the problem with
change of variables:
x ′ = projS (д(z)), z ∼ N(z |µ,σ 2) (24)
where д : Rdim(µ) 7→ Rdim(x ). The transformation steps involve sampling z i.e z ∼ N(µ,σ 2),
then д(z) is computed: д(z) = 12(tanh(д0(z))+1) . After this, δ ′ = clipp (д(z) − x) for p = 2 or∞:
clip2(δ ) =
{
δτ2/| |δ | |2 i f | |δ | |2 > τ2
δ else
(25)
clip∞ =min(δ ,τ∞) (26)
Updated J (θ ) due to variable transformation:
J (θ ) = EN(z |µ,σ 2) f (proj(д(z)))
θ = (µ,σ 2) are the unknowns. σ is found using Grid Search and NES [42] is used to find µ:
µt+1 ← µt − η∇µ J (θ )|µt
µt+1 ← µt − η
b
b∑
i=1
f (projS (д(zi )))∇µloдN(zi |µt ,σ 2) (27)
The process is iteratively repeated until arriving at an sampled image x ′ such that C(x ′) ,
C(x).
• GenAttack: Alzantot et al. [24] use genetic algorithms, which are population-based gradient-
free optimization strategies to produce an adversarial image. The author justifies using the
above approach by mentioning the overhead produced by excessive querying in Gradient
Estimation Methods and also the added advantage of being able to bypass defenses based
on Gradient Masking and Obfuscation. The Genetic Algorithm is based on the process of
natural selection, which involves iteratively choosing the P set of candidates that constitute a
generation in each iteration. The quality of the candidates is assessed using a fitness function,
and the candidates for the next generation are obtained using crossover, i.e., breeding of
parents selected randomly to produce a child and mutation which is the noise added to the
child to reflect the diversity of the population. The fitness function proposed here can be
shown as:
Fitness(x) = loд f (x)t − loд
j=k∑
j=0, j,t
f (x)c (28)
Here f : Rd− > [0, 1]K is the black box classifier which outputs probabilities of the K classes
and t is the label for targeted attack. The parents for crossover are randomly sampled using
probs , i.e. the probabilities which are obtained using softmax of the fitness values. Crossover
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operation involves selecting features of parent1 and parent2 with (p, 1 − p) respectively
where p = f itness(parent1)f itness(parent1)+f itness(parent2) . A Child is mutated using the following formula
childmut = child + Bernoulli(p) ∗ U(−αδmax ,αδmax ). α , ρ and δmax are mutation range,
mutation probability and l∞ metric respectively.
• SimBA: The study shown in [25] proposes a straightforward yet efficient approach to generate
adversarial examples in a black-box setting. From a setQ of orthonormal vectors, the algorithm
picks any single vector q, and the modification made to the input image x can be expressed as
x + qϵ or x − qϵ . The idea behind this is to modify and add noise to the image in a particular
direction and check if this brings about a change in the probability P(y |x), which represents
the probability of the label being y given the input image x . Here, ϵ represents the step size
and can be controlled by the adversary. To keep the number of queries to the target model
minimum, the methodology proposed ensures that when the algorithm picks q ∈ Q , there
are no two directions that cancel out each other.
Inspired by the work of Guo [43], the authors suggest making use of low-frequency noise
to be added to the input image for generating better adversarial examples. They employ
the discrete cosine transform (DCT) to map signals in a 2D image space Rdxd to frequency
coefficients belongs to cosine wave function magnitudes.
4.1.4 Combinatorics.
• Combinatorial Optimization: In the approach presented in [22], the optimization problem
has been treated as a discrete surrogate problem. The authors support this my mentioning
that first-order attacks like FGSM [37] and PGD [44] have a good performance due to their
constrained nature and also due to querying the gradient of the loss concerning the input.
Using the Taylor Expansion, the loss and the optimization problem becomes:
l(xadv ,y) ≈ l(x ,y) + (xadv − x)T∇x l(x ,y)
maximize | |xadv−x | |∞≤ϵ ⇒maximizexadvxadvT∇x l(x ,y) subject to − ϵ1 ⪯ xadv − x ⪯ ϵ1 (29)
Due to the bounds present in the equation 29, the authors concluded that the solution of
the above linear program would be obtained at the vertex of the l∞ ball. So the reformulated
optimization problem becomes:
maximizeS⊆V
F (S) ≜ f ©­«x + ϵ
∑
i ∈S
ei − ϵ
∑
i<S
ei
ª®¬
 (30)
where f (x) = l(x ,yдt ) for untargeted attacks and f (x) = −l(x ,ytarдet ) for targeted attacks.
They then explain the property of submodularity, a function F : 2V → R is submodular if for
every A ⊆ B ⊆ V and e ∈ V \ B: ∆(e |A) ≥ ∆(e |B). So submodular functions exhibit a dimin-
ishing property as set size increases. With submodularity and using greedy style algorithms,
it is possible to obtain (1 − 1e ) approximation of global optimum for monotone submodular
functions and 13 approximation for non-monotone submodular functions. The authors use
a modified version of local search algorithm by Fiege et al. [45] which alternates between
greedily inserting the element while the marginal gain is strictly positive
(
∆
(
e |S > 0) ) and
removing the element while the marginal gain is also strictly positive.
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4.2 Comparative Analysis of Black Box attack techniques
The attack methods proposed have been tested quantitatively on three primary datasets, as men-
tioned earlier, i.e., MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. Therefore, we present a qualitative comparison
between the results of these techniques based. The results can be first divided broadly into two
categories: Targeted & Untargeted attacks for each of the three datasets. In each table, we mention
the model used for generating the adversarial attack, the average number of queries made to the
targeted model, average L2 distance between the original image and the perturbed image, attack
success rate and lastly some specific parameters mentioned in the experiments of the respective
study. The results for different comparative parameters are obtained from standard performance
metrics as produced by the individual research studies.
Method Model Average # Queries Average L2 Attack Success Rate Specific Parameters Used
Chen et al. [10] InceptionV3 - 1.19916 88.90% Step Size = 0.002, # Iterations = 1500
Brendel et al. [11] ResNet-50 192102 4.876 100% -
Cheng et al. [13] ResNet-50 145176 4.934 100% -
Moon et al. [22] InceptionV3 722 - 98.50% L∞ setting, ϵ = 0.05, Max # Queries = 10,000
Guo et al. [25] InceptionV3 1283 3.06 97.80% Step Size = 0.2, # Iterations = 10,000
Table 2. Comparison of methods used for generating an untargeted attack on the ImageNet data set.
From Table 2, we can see that the attack success rate for [11] and [13] is 100%. However, the
technique proposed by [22] takes the least number of queries to produce a successful black-box
attack.
Method Model Average # Queries Average L2 Attack Success Rate Specific Parameters Used
Chen et al. [10] InceptionV3 - 3.425 - Batch Size = 128, # Iterations = 20,000
Ilyas et al. [12] InceptionV3 11550 - 99.20% L∞ setting, ϵ = 0.05
Du et al. [15] InceptionV3 1701 24.323 100% Image size-64x64, Momentum factor = 0.4
Tu et al. [16] InceptionV3 13525 0.000136 100% Regularization coefficient = 10
Chen et al. [19] InceptionV3 3573 4.559451 95% # Iterations = 400
ResNet-50 3614 3.0575142 98% # Iterations = 400
VGG19 3786 4.023045 96% # Iterations = 400
Brunner et al. [20] InceptionV3 - - 85% Max # Queries = 15,000, L2 setting, ϵ = 25.89
Moon et al. [22] InceptionV3 7485 - 99.90% L∞ setting, ϵ = 0.05, Max # Queries = 100,000
Ilyas et al. [23] InceptionV3 1858 - 84.50% Max # Queries = 10,000, L2 setting
InceptionV3 1117 - 95.40% Max # Queries = 10,000, L∞ setting
ResNet-50 993 - 90.30% Max # Queries = 10,000, L2 setting
ResNet-50 722 - 96.60% Max # Queries = 10,000, L∞ setting
VGG16 594 - 82.80% Max # Queries = 10,000, L2 setting
VGG16 370 - 91.60% Max # Queries = 10,000, L∞ setting
Alzantot et al. [24] InceptionV3 11081 61.68669 100% Max # Queries = 1,000,000, L∞ setting, ϵ = 0.05
Guo et al. [25] InceptionV3 7899 9.53 100% Step Size = 0.2, # Iterations = 30,000
Table 3. Comparison of methods used for generating a targeted attack on the ImageNet data set.
A lot of models such as Inception-V3, ResNet-50, VGG16, and VGG19 have been used to exper-
iment with targeted attacks on ImageNet data set, and this can be seen in Table 3. The attacks
mentioned in [15] and [24] suffer significantly in terms of the average L2 distance parameter as
compared to the others. The authors in [23] used three different models and experimented with
their attack by keeping a limit on the max number of queries at 10,000 in L2 and L∞ settings. The
number of queries was less than 2000 and, in most cases, below 1000, whereas the attack success
rate ranged from 82.80% using the VGG16 model to 96.60% in ResNet-50.
In Table 4, three out of four methods achieve a 100% success rate, whereas only the attack
proposed by [13] surpasses the others in the remaining two parameters.
Almost all the methods in Table 5 show a 100% attack success rate. The attacks proposed in
[16, 19, 24] achieve an attack in less than 1000 queries.
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Method Model Average # Queries Average L2 Attack Success Rate Specific Parameters Used
Chen et al. [10] - - 1.4955 100% Batch Size = 128, Step Size = 0.01, # Iterations = 3000
Brendel et al. [11] ResNet-50 131972 1.11545 100% -
Cheng et al. [13] ResNet-50 67036 1.0827 100% -
Bhagoji et al. [14] - - 2.7 99.7 Batch Size = 100
Table 4. Comparison of methods used for generating an untargeted attack on the MNIST data set.
Method Model Average # Queries Average L2 Attack Success Rate Specific Parameters Used
Chen et al. [10] - - 1.9871 98.90% Batch Size = 128, Step Size = 0.01, # Iterations = 3000
Brendel et al. [11] ResNet-50 93543 2.0626 100% -
Cheng et al. [13] ResNet-50 59094 1.7793 100% -
Bhagoji et al. [14] Self-designed, accuracy = 99.2% 62720 - 100% Batch Size = 100, L∞ setting, ϵ = 0.3
Tu et al. [16] C&W [32] 2428 3.55936 100% Regularization coefficient = 0.1
C&W [32] 730 3.23792 100% Regularization coefficient = 1
C&W [32] 510 3.66128 100% Regularization coefficient = 10
Chen et al. [19] - 423 2.352 100% # Iterations = 100
Alzantot et al. [24] - 996 - 100% Step Size = 1.0, Max # Queries = 100,000
Table 5. Comparison of methods used for generating a targeted attack on the MNIST data set.
Method Model Average # Queries Average L2 Attack Success Rate Specific Parameters Used
Chen et al. [10] - - 0.19973 100% Batch Size = 128, Step Size = 0.01, # Iterations = 1000
Brendel et al. [11] ResNet-50 384204 4.8758 - -
Cheng et al. [13] ResNet-50 145176 4.9339 - -
Bhagoji et al. [14] ResNet-32 - - 100% Batch Size = 100
Moon et al. [22] ResNet-32 1261 - 48% Max # Queries = 20,000
Table 6. Comparison of methods used for generating an untargeted attack on the CIFAR-10 data set.
In Table 6, the black-box attack proposed by [10] achieves an exceptional performance by getting
a 100% success rate while getting an average L2 distance of 0.19973. [22] uses a ResNet-32 model to
achieve an average of 1261 queries. However, the attack success rate is as low as 48%.
Method Model Average # Queries Average L2 Attack Success Rate Specific Parameters Used
Chen et al. [10] same as 14 - 0.39879 96.80% Batch Size = 128, Step Size = 0.01, # Iterations = 1000
Brendel et al. [11] ResNet-50 170972 0.2395 - -
Cheng et al. [13] ResNet-50 130020 0.2476 - -
Bhagoji et al. [14] ResNet-32 61440 - 100% Batch Size = 100, L∞ setting, ϵ = 8
Tu et al. [16] C&W [32] 1524 3.6864 100% Regularization coefficient = 0.1
C&W [32] 332 0.00101 100% Regularization coefficient = 1
C&W [32] 259 0.00115 100% Regularization coefficient = 10
Chen et al. [19] same as 4 381 0.2088 100% # Iterations = 100
Alzantot et al. [24] 804 - 96.50% Step Size = 1.0, Max # Queries = 100,000
Table 7. Comparison of methods used for generating a targeted attack on the CIFAR-10 data set.
As shown in Table 7, again the models proposed in [16, 19, 24] achieve a high attack success rate
percentage while using less than 1000 queries on the targeted model. Most of the attacks shown in
this table perform well in terms of the average L2 distance parameter.
5 DEFENSE AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of recent works in the defenses proposed against
adversarial attacks. Conventional paradigms in defenses follow gradient masking, input transfor-
mation, adversarial training, adversarial detection-based approaches. The following subsections
discuss each of these paradigms, with key examples from each concept.
5.1 Defense Techniques
5.1.1 Gradient Masking.
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Month Year Method Proposed Approach
Mar 2016 Papernot et al. [46] Distillation
Mar 2017 Hosseini et al. [47] NULL Labeling
Sep 2017 Meng et al. [48] MagNet
Dec 2017 Xu et al. [49] Feature Squeezing
Jan 2018 Guo et al. [50] Input Transformations
Feb 2018 Buckman et al. [51] Thermometer Encoding
Feb 2018 Samangouei et al. [52] Defense-GAN
Feb 2018 Xie et al. [53] Randomization
Mar 2018 Dhillon et al. [54] SAP
Mar 2018 Kannan et al. [55] ALP
Mar 2018 Prakash et al. [56] Pixel Deflection
Apr 2018 Shaham et al. [57] Basis Functions Transformation
May 2018 Liao et al. [58] Guided Denoiser
May 2018 Song et al. [59] Pixel Defend
Jun 2018 Wong et al. [60] Convex Adversarial Polytope
Sep 2018 Trame´r et al. [61] Ensemble Adversarial Training
Sep 2018 Madry et al. [62] M-PGD
Nov 2018 Rakin et al. [63] PNI
Mar 2019 Xie et al. [64] Feature Denoising
Jun 2019 Cohen et al. [65] Randomized Smoothing
Jul 2019 Mustafa et al. [66] Hidden Space Restriction
Table 8. A comparison of works that have focused on defenses against an adversarial setting.
Defense Mechanisms against Adversarial Attacks
Gradient Masking Input Transformation Adversarial Training Adversarial Detection
Classification of prior work on defense strategies proposed against adversarial attacks.
• Papernot et al. [46]
• Xie et al. [53]
• Dhillon et al. [54]
• Guo et al. [50]
• Buckman et al. [51]
• Samangouei et al. [52]
• Prakash et al. [56]
• Shaham et al. [57]
• Liao et al. [58]
• Song et al. [59]
• Hosseini et al. [47]
• Trame´r et al. [61]
• Kannan et al. [55]
• Rakin et al. [63]
• Xie et al. [64]
• Cohen et al. [65]
•Mustafa et al. [66]
•Madry et al. [62]
•Meng et al. [48]
• Xu et al. [49]
•Wong et al. [60]
• Distillation: The defense mechanism proposed by the authors [46] is based on distillation
introduced by Hinton et al. [67]. Distillation, in an easy sense, is used to transfer knowledge
from larger to smaller DNN architectures to reduce computational complexity. Given a train-
ing data set
{(X ,Y (X )) : X ∈ X} where X are the images, and Y are the one-hot vector(e.g.,
{0,0,1...0}) spread over the length of classes with the correct class having 1, a deep neural
network F is trained with softmax output layer with temperature T which is used to control
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the knowledge transfer. F (X ) is the probability vector over all the classes. A second training
set
{(X , F (X )) : X ∈ X} is obtained and F (X ) obtained from the first DNN are here used as
the soft labels. A second model, Fd , is trained using this dataset, and this model is called a
distilled model. This model is much more smoothed. The amplitude of its network gradients
exploited by adversarial samples are also thereby reduced.
• Randomization: The goal of this paper [53] is to alleviate adversarial attacks by introducing
two random layers at inference time: 1) Random Resizing 2) Random Padding. These random-
ization effects help to defend against single-step and iterative gradient-based attacks. The
random resizing layer converts an image of sizeW ∗H∗3 into a new image of sizeW ′∗H ′∗3
such that |W ′ −W | and |H ′ − H | are within a reasonably small range. The random padding
layer pads zeros around the resized image in a randommanner. Suppose after random padding
the size of the image isW ′′∗H ′′∗3 then there are (W ′′ −W ′ + 1)∗(H ′′ − H ′ + 1) different
possible patterns.
• SAP: The authors [54] have proposed Stochastic Activation Pruning as a method for guarding
pre-trained networks against adversarial examples. During the forward pass, they stochasti-
cally prune a subset of activations in each layer. After pruning, they scale up the surviving
activations to normalize the dynamic range of inputs to the subsequent layers. Deriving
inspiration from game theory [68], they treat the problem as a minimax zero-sum game
between adversary and the model:
π ∗, ρ∗ := arд minπmaxρEp∼π ,r∼ρ [J (Mp (θ ),x + r ,y)], (31)
where ρ is the adversary’s policy from which r ∼ ρ perturbation is sampled and π is the
defender’s policy from which p ∼ π model parameters corresponding toMp (θ ) is sampled.
The adversary’s goal is to maximize the defender’s loss under strategy ρ and defender’s goal
is to minimize the loss by changing model parameters θ to Mp (θ ) under strategy π . Now
given the i’th layer activation map,hi ∈ Rai , the probability of sampling j’th activation with
value (hi )j is given by:
pij =
|(hi )j |∑ai
k=1 |(hi )k |
If activation is sampled, it is scaled up by inverse of the probability of sampling over all
draws. If not, then the activation is set to 0. In this way, the inverse propensity scoring of
each activation is preserved. Under an instance p of policy π , r ip sample are drawn giving a
new activation mapMp (hi ):
Mp (hi ) = hi ⊙mip (mip )j =
I((hi )j )
1 − (1 − pij )r
i
p
This scheme is similar to dropout [69]; however, it differs from it in its sampling technique:
SAP is more likely to sample activations that are high in absolute value whereas dropout
samples each activation with the same probability.
5.1.2 Input Transformation.
• Input Transformations: The authors [50] tested several input transformations-1) Image
Cropping and Rescaling 2) Bit Depth Reduction [49] 3) JPEG Image Compression and De-
compression [70] 4) Total Variance Minimization [71] 5) Image Quilting [72] and their
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corresponding effects in withstanding different adversarial attacks. Specifically, total vari-
ance minimization and image quilting were effective defenses when the model is trained on
transformed images. Their strength lies in their non-differential nature and randomness which
makes it difficult for the adversary to circumvent them. Total Variance Minimization involves
synthesizing an image z from adversarial input x by solving:
minz | |(1 − X ) ⊙ (z − x)| |2 + λTV .TVp (z) (32)
This approach selects a small set of pixels and reconstructs the image x that is consistent with
the selected pixels. The pixels are selected by sampling a Bernoulli Random Variable X (i, j,k)
at each pixel position (i, j,k), and the pixel is set when X (i, j,k) = 1. ⊙ is the element-wise
multiplication.
TVp (z) =
K∑
k=1

N∑
i=2
| |z(i, :,k) − z(i − 1, :,k)| |p +
N∑
j=2
| |z(:, j,k) − z(:, j − 1,k)| |p
 (33)
TVp (z) is the total lp variation of z. The total variation(TV) measures the fine-scale variation
in z, thereby encouraging the removal of adversarial perturbation during TV minimization.
Image Quilting is a technique that involves synthesizing images by combining images ob-
tained from a database. The algorithm places image patches for a predefined set of grid points
and computes minimum graph cuts in overlapping boundary regions to remove edge artifacts.
• Thermometer Encoding: Buckman et al. [51] proposes a input discretization method to
break the linear extrapolation behaviour of machine learning models. Goodfellow et al. [73]
provided evidence that several network architectures are vulnerable to adversarial examples
as the loss function of these networks tend to be highly linear to its inputs. Though neural
networks, in principle, can represent highly non-linear functions, networks trained via
SGD tend to converge to linear solutions. One hypothesis explaining this states that the
nonlinearities used in networks are piece-wise linear. Instead of using highly complex non-
linear functions that are difficult to train and generalize, the authors have specified a simple
non-differentiable and non-linear transformation(discretization). Two discretization methods
have been specified: 1) One Hot Encoding: for a pixel i ∈ {1, 2, ...n}:
foneshot (xi ) = χ (b(xi )) (34)
where b(θ ) is the quantization function. For bi = ik , b(θ ) is the largest index α ∈ {1, 2, ...k}
such that θ ≤ bα . χ (j) is the one hot vector of j i.e χ (j) ∈ Rk such that:
χ (j)l =
{
1 i f l = j
0 otherwise
So for an input pixel i , b(.) obtains the index α such that i ≤ bα . χ (.) computes the one hot
vector spread across the length of the input dimension and sets 1 at index α and 0 everywhere
else.
2) Thermometer Encoding: For a pixel i ∈ {1, 2, ...k}:
ftherm(xi ) = τ (b(xi )) = C(foneshot (xi )) (35)
where C is the cumulative sum function, C(c)l = ∑lj=0 cl . τ (j) is the thermometer vector i.e
τ (j) ∈ Rk such that:
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τ (j)l =
{
1 i f l >= j
0 otherwise
τ (j) computes the thermometer vector, which is one hot vector with consecutive one after
the index α obtained using the b(.) function.
• Defense-GAN: Samangouei et al. [52] proposed a defense mechanism based on Wasserstein-
GAN [74]. A GAN is a model in which min-max game is played between two adversaries:- a
generator(G) and a discriminator(D). The W-GAN is similar to GAN, but instead of min-max
loss, Wasserstein loss is used for learning the distribution of unperturbed images. At inference
time, it finds a close output to the given input image which does not contain adversarial
changes i.e., for an input image x we obtain z∗ such that:
z∗ = minz | |G(z) − x | |22 (36)
The above minimization problem is solved by doing L steps of Gradient Descent on R different
random initializations of z. Then G(z∗) is added as the input to the classifier. The motivation
of the above mechanism is derived from the global optimality of GAN min-max loss when
pд = pdata i.e., the probability that the image is sampled from data distribution is equal to
that of the generator and if G and D have enough capacity to represent the data, and the
training algorithm is such that pд converges to pdata then:
Ex∼pdata
[
minz | |Gt (z) − x | |2
] → 0 (37)
where E is the expected reconstruction loss which after t steps of training converges to 0,
thereby indicating minuscule performance loss on clean examples. This minimization of
reconstruction loss helps in reducing the adversarial noise.
• Pixel Deflection: The authors have proposed two methods for defending against adversarial
attacks: 1) Pixel Deflection samples pixels randomly in an input image and replaces it with
another randomly sampled pixel from its square neighborhood. Intuitively, Prakash et al.
[56] show that adversarial attacks tend to add perturbations in the entire plane of the image,
disregarding the location of the object. The background pixels are not that useful in the
classification of the object. By Pixel Deflection, certain pixels are dropped, preserving enough
background for classification and mitigate the impact of adversarial attacks. The probability
for a pixel to be dropped is inversely proportional to the probability of that pixel constituting
the part of an object i.e
Pru (Pi ) ∝ 1
Pro(Pi )
2) Wavelet Denoising is used to reduce noise introduced by both pixel deflection and ad-
versarial attacks. Prior works [75–77] illustrate certain regularities in wavelet responses of
natural images that can be used to denoise images. The author’s method uses Discrete Wavelet
Transform [78], which converts the image signal into orthonormal wavelets. These wavelets
form the basis for an image’s space, orientation, and scale, etc.
• Basis Function Transformations: Shaham et al. [57] augments images at inference time
using basis functions. The transformations smoothen the images thereby reducing adversarial
noise. Basis functions are known functions (usually polynomial) on which linear regression
is performed in order to model a non-linear function. The basis functions used in this paper
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include: 1) Low Pass Filtering 2) Principal Component Analysis 3)Wavelet Approximation 4)
Soft-thresholding 5) JPEG Compression
• Guided Denoiser: Since adversarial samples are based on adding noise to clean images,
the natural idea that came to the authors was to develop denoising models as a defense
mechanism [58]. They defined two denoising networks:
1)Pixel Guided Denoiser(PGD): Given a clean image x , the denoiser D : x∗ → xˆ is used to
convert the adversarial image x∗ into xˆ such that L = | |x − xˆ | | is minimized where L is the
L1 norm. Two denoising functions were discussed-1) Denoising Autoencoder(DAE) [79] and
Denoising U-Net(DUNET) which was DAE modified with U-Net [80].
2)High-Level representation Guided Denoiser(HGD): HGD uses the same U-Net struc-
ture as DUNET but differs with it in terms of the loss function. Given a target neural network
f , the HGD minimizes the loss L = | | f (x)l − f (xˆ)l | | where f (x)l is the representation of
the neural network at layer l . Three variants of HGD were also specified-1) When l = −2,
then the representations of the top-most convolutional layer is used, and the denoiser is
called Feature Guided Denoiser. 2)When l = −1, logit layer representations are used, and the
denoiser is called Logits Guided Denoiser. 3)When the classification loss of the target model is
used as a denoising loss function, then the denoiser is called Class Guided Denoiser.
• PixelDefend: The authors [59] have proposed the defense mechanism PixelDefend which
aims to detect adversarial images and modify the input images such that it resembles more
the images derived from the training distribution p(x). The training distribution p(x) is learnt
through a PixelCNN [81](p(x)=pCNN (x)). The probabilities of the input image, X ′ ∼ q(X ) and
training images, {X1,X2, ...XN } ∼ p(X ) are evaluated using PixelCNN and rank of pCNN (X ′)
in {pCNN (X1),pCNN (X2), ...pCNN (XN )} is used as a text-statistic:
T = T (X ′;X1....XN ) ≜
N∑
i=1
I[pCNN (Xi ) ≤ pCNN (X ′)].
The above equation is used to calculate the p-value, which is used as a metric to decide
whether an image is adversarial or not:
p =
1
N + 1
©­«
N∑
i=1
I[Ti ≤ T ] + 1ª®¬ = T + 1N + 1 = 1N + 1 ©­«
N∑
i=1
I[pCNN (Xi ) ≤ pCNN (X ′)] + 1ª®¬ (38)
Now the input image X is used to calculate the image X ∗ that maximizes p(X ) subject to the
constraint that X ∗ is within the ϵdef end ball(maximum perturbation) of X :
maxX ∗p(X ∗)
s .t | |X − X ∗ | |∞ ≤ ϵdef end
Iteratively pixels (x ← X [i, j,k]) are sampled from the rangeR ← [max(x−ϵdef end , 0),min(x+
ϵdef end , 255)], with the goal to maximize the training data distribution p(X ∗).
5.1.3 Adversarial Training.
• NULL Labeling: In this paper [47], the authors propose to block transferability by training
a classifier such that as input noise level increases, the classifier shows lower confidence on
the original label and instead declares the input invalid. The method consists of three steps:
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1) initial training, 2) computing NULL probabilities for adversarial examples generated with
different amounts of perturbations 3)adversarial training.
The compute function f , which is used for computing the null probability pNU LL for adver-
sarial examples, in this case, is taken as theMGMethod. During the Adversarial training
phase, the adversarial examples are generated using STG Method. The network is trained
based on the following optimization problems:
δX ∗ = arдminδX l(X + δX ,ZT ;θ ), s .t .| |δX | |0 ∼ U [1,Nmax ]
θ ∗ = arдminθαl(X ,Z ;θ ) + (1 − α)l(X + δX ∗,ZA;θ )
Here l(X ,Z ;θ ) is the loss function with the parameters θ . X and X ∗ are the input and ad-
versarial images, respectively. δX is the noise sampled from the uniform distributionU in
the range [1,Nmax ] where Nmax is the minimum number for which f (Nmax|X | ) = 1 where f is
the classifier. ZT is the probability vector that is used for generating adversarial examples,
whereas ZA is the desired output probability vector. α is the hyperparameter that controls
the training between clean and adversarial samples.
• Ensemble Adversarial Training: Tramer et al. [61] hypothesized that Kurakin et al.’s [82]
adversarially trained model on single-step attacks was still vulnerable to multi-step attacks.
He proposed Ensemble Adversarial Training as a method for decoupling the adversarial exam-
ples from the parameters of the trained model and increase the diversity of perturbations
seen during training. The algorithm augments the training dataset of the target model with
adversarial examples transferred from other static pre-trained models. Intuitively, the transfer
of adversarial examples from multiple models acts as a good approximation of maximization
problem in Madry et al.’s [62] paper, which was not possible from transferable single step
attacks.
• ALP: In this paper [55], Kannan et al. proposed a method called as logit pairing and its 2
variants- clean and adversarial. They compared their method with a modified version of
defense proposed by Madry et al. [83] which they formulated asmixed minibatch PGD.
M-PGD is stated as min-max problem:
arдminθ
[
E(x,y)∈pˆdata
(
maxδ ∈SL(θ ,x + δ ,y)
)
+ E(x,y)∈pˆdata
(
L(θ ,x ,y)) ] (39)
Adversarial and Clean Logit Pairing involve minimizing following losses respectively:
J (M,θ ) + λ 1
m
m∑
i=1
L
(
f (x (i);θ ), f (x¯ (i);θ )
)
(40)
J (clean)(M,θ ) + λ 2
m
m
2∑
i=1
L
(
f (x (i);θ ), f (x (i+m2 );θ )
)
(41)
Here J (M,θ ) is the classifier loss for minibatchM. λ and m are the penalizing coefficient and
training size respectively. f (x ,θ ) is the logit layer and L is the loss function for calculating
the similarity of two images. Here L is the L2 distance metric and in equation [40] (x , x¯) are
the training and its adversarial image respectively and in equation [41] (x , x´) are two random
training images respectively.
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• M-PGD: Madry et al. [62] conducts a careful examination of the optimization problem in the
study of adversarial attacks and robust models. He proposes a guarantee that a adversarial
robust model should satisfy in the form of a Saddle-Point problem:
minθ ρ(θ ), where ρ(θ ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
maxδ ∈SL(θ ,x + δ ,y)
]
(42)
Evaluation of local maxima of loss values by using PGD [44] attack on MNIST and CIFAR-
10 models suggest that PGD is the universal adversary among the first-order approaches.
Robustness against PGD yields robustness against all first-order adversaries i.e., as long as
the adversary uses the gradients of the loss function w.r.t input, it will not find significantly
better local maxima than PGD. So to maximize the inner optimization problem, PGD is the
best first-order attack, whereas adversarial training is the solution for the outer optimiza-
tion problem. The authors also provide a comparative study of network capacity against
adversarial robustness. For a weaker black-box attack based on transferability, increased
network capacity decreases transferability. Adversarial training using stronger adversaries
also reduces transferability.
• PNI: Rakin et al. [63] has proposed Parametric Noise Injection which aims to make the model
more robust by adding trainable gaussian noise at each layer on either activation or weights
during the adversarial training phase:
v¯i = fPN I (vi ) = vi + αi .η; η ∼ N(0,σ 2) (43)
where σ =
√
1
N
∑
i
(vi − µ) (44)
Here vi is the element of noise-free tensor v , which can be input/weight/activation. η is the
noise sampled from the gaussian distribution, and αi is the learnable noise parameter, which
is the same along with a layer to avoid over-parameterization and facilitate convergence. The
gradient computation of loss w.r.t to noise is:
∂L
∂α
=
∑
i
∂L
∂ fPN I (vi )
∂ fPN I (vi )
∂α
; ∂ fPN I (vi )
∂α
= η
Using a gradient descent optimizer with momentum, the optimization of α at step j can be
written as:
V ji =m.V
j−1
i +
∂L j−1
∂α
; α j = α j−1 − ϵ .V ji
where m is the momentum, ϵ is the learning rate, and V is the updating velocity.
• Feature Denoising: Xie et al. [64] suggests that small perturbations added in the input
domain lead to substantial noise in the feature maps of the network. While the feature maps
of clean images focus on semantically relevant content, the feature maps of adversarial images
are even activated in the irrelevant regions.
Motivated by this, he proposes feature denoising as a defense mechanism. Adversarial Training
of the classifier is performed together with the addition of a denoising block. The structure of
the block is inspired from self-attention [84] and Non-Local Networks [85].
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Several denoising operations have been mentioned in this paper: 1) Non-Local Means [86]:
For a input feature map x , a denoised feature mapy is computed by weighted mean of features
in all spatial locations L:
yi =
1
C(x)
∑
∀j ∈L
f (xi ,x j ).x j , (45)
where f (xi ,x j ) is the feature dependent weighting function and C(x) is the normalization
function. Two Variants have been discussed- 1) Gaussian(softmax) sets where f (xi ,x j ) =
e
1√
d
θ (xi )T ϕ(x j ) and C = ∑∀j ∈L f (xi ,x j ) and 2) Dot Product sets where f (xi ,x j ) = xTi x j and
C(x) = N where N is the number of pixels in x . 2) Bilateral Filter [87]:It is similar to Equa-
tion[45] but differs from it in its neighborhood Ω(i), which is a local region (e.g a 3X3 patch)
around pixel i . 3)Mean Filter: Simplest denoising operation is the mean filter i.e average
pooling with a stride of 1. Mean filters reduce noise but also smooth structures. 4)Median
Filter: It is defined as yi =median{∀j ∈ Ω(i) : x j } where the median is over a local region
Ω(i) and is performed separately for each channel. It is good at removing salt and pepper noise.
• Randomized Smoothing: The goal of this defense method is to obtain a new classifier д
from base classifier f which returns the most probable class when the input x perturbed with
Gaussian Noise is added to the base classifier:
д(x) = arдmaxc ∈Y P(f (x + ϵ) = c), ϵ ∼ N(0,σ 2I ) (46)
Now n samples of Gaussian noise are drawn and added to the input image x . These noisy
samples of x are given as input to the base classifier f and the class counts are obtained. If ˆcA
and ˆcB are the two classes with maximum counts nA and nB then a Binomial Hypothesis test
is performed to obtain the p-value (nA ∼ Binomial(nA + nB ,p)). If the p-value is less than a
constant α then return ˆcA otherwise abstain from returning an output.
• Hidden Space Restriction: The authors of this paper suggest that the main reason for
perturbations is the close-proximity of different class samples in the learned space. To
counter this, they proposed to disentangle class-wise intermediate feature representation
of deep networks i.e., force the features of each class to lie inside a convex region, which is
maximally separated from the regions of other classes. For a input sample x let the adversarial
polytope (convex region within which the label of the input image doesn’t change) be
Pϵ (x ;θ ) = Fθ (x + δ ) s .t ., | |δ | |p ≤ ϵ , then O i, jϵ represents the overlap region between data
pair (i, j) i.e O i, jϵ = Pϵ (x iyi ;θ ) ∩ Pϵ (x jyj ;θ ). The authors propose that reducing this overlap
region between different classes will result in lower adversarial success. To achieve this, the
authors augment the loss function used while training. This new loss added is called Prototype
Conformity Loss:
LPC (x ,y) =
∑
i
 | | fi −wcyi | |2 −
1
k − 1
∑
j,yi
(
| | fi −wcj | |2 + | |wcyi −wcj | |2
) (47)
where fi denotes the DNN output representation of image i andwcyi are the trainable centroids
of classyi . At inference time, the label is given to an image i as follows: yˆi = arдminj | | fi−wcyj | |.
The total loss function for training the model is:
L(x ,y) = LCE (x ,y) + LPC (x ,y) (48)
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Where LCE (.) is the cross-entropy loss. To obtain identical effect in intermediate layers,
LPC (.) is calculated using a branch Gϕ , which maps the features to a lower dimension. So
the final loss becomes:
L = LCE +
L∑
l
LPC
where LlPC = LPC (f l ,y)
s .t ., f l = Glϕ (F lθ (x))
5.1.4 Adversarial Detection.
• MagNet: MagNet [48] is used for defending neural network classifiers against adversarial
examples. MagNet consists of two components: 1) a detector which rejects examples far from
the decision boundary of different classes. 2) a reformer which given an input x strives to
find x ′ such that x ′ is a close approximation of x and also is close to the normal examples
manifold(decision boundary).
Detector: The detector is the function d : S → 0, 1 which detects whether the input is
adversarial. Two kinds of detector were mentioned in the literature: 1) Detector based on
Reconstruction Error - In this an autoencoder is trained using the normal samples. The loss
function minimized in this case is:
L(Xtrain) = 1|Xtrain |
∑
x ∈Xtrain
| |x − ae(x)| |2
ae(x) denotes the reconstructed image obtained from the autoencoder ae . The reconstruction
error on a test sample x is:
E(x) = | |x − ae(x)| |p (49)
where E(x) is the lp distance between input image and its reconstructed image. If E(x) is
greater than some constant δp then the input is an adversarial example otherwise it is not. 2)
Detector based on probability divergence - Let f (x) be the output of the last layer(softmax) of
the neural network f given an input x . Then in this case probability divergence of f (x) and
f (ae(x)) is evaluated using Jensen-Shannon Divergence:
JSD(P | |Q) = 12DKL(P | |M) +
1
2DKL(Q | |M) (50)
whereDKL(P | |Q) = ∑i P(i)loд P (i)Q (i) is the Kullback–Leibler Divergence andM = 12 (P+Q). The
Jensen–Shannon divergence is a method of measuring the similarity between two probability
distributions P and Q .
Reformer: The reformer is the function r : S→ Nt which tries to reconstruct the test input
so that it is closer to the training data manifold. An ideal reformer: 1) should not change
classification results of normal samples and 2) should change adversarial samples adequately
such that the reformed samples are close to normal samples. Two kinds of reform strategies
were proposed: 1) Noise based Reformer : a naive reformer which adds random noise to the
input sampled from a Gaussian distribution i.e r (x) = clip(x + ϵ .y) where y ∼ N (y; 0, I ). 2)
Autoencoder based Reformer : In this case the autoencoder trained for detector ae(x) is used.
For an input x ′ the reconstruction obtained from autoencoder ae(x ′) is fed to the target
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classifier as it is closer to the normal samples manifold.
• Feature Squeezing: Xu et al. [49] argues that feature input spaces are unnecessarily large.
So he proposed a mechanism to reduce the degrees of freedom available to an adversary by
squeezing out unnecessary input features. Feature Squeezing is a simple adversarial example
detection framework that compares the model’s prediction on the original sample with its
prediction after squeezing. If the difference is higher than a threshold value, then the sample
is adversarial and is discarded.
Two techniques have been proposed by the authors:1)Squeezing Color Bits: Grayscale images
comprise of 8-bit pixel values, whereas color images consist of 24-bit pixels. The bit depth
can be considerably reduced without much loss of information, thereby reducing the search
space for adversarial samples. This is done by using a binary filter with 0.5 as the cutoff.
2) Spatial Smoothing: It is an image processing technique that is used to reduce noise. Its
two variations have been mentioned:1) Local Smoothing: Smoothes the value of a pixel in a
particular window size by using nearby pixels. In this paper, the Median Smoothing was used.
2) Non-Local Smoothing: For a given image patch, non-local smoothing finds several similar
patches in a larger area and then replaces the center patch with the average of those patches.
• Convex adversarial polytope: In this paper, Wong et al. [60] proposed a method for
obtaining provably robust ReLU classifiers. For a ReLU based neural network f where
fθ : R |x | → R |y | , we obtain an adversarial polytope (Zϵ (x)) which is the set of all final
layer activations that can be obtained by perturbing the input with ∆. Here, ∆ is l∞ norm
bounded by ϵ :
Zϵ (x) = { fθ (x + ∆) : | |∆| |∞ ≤ ϵ} (51)
Now, a convex outer bound on this adversarial polytope is created. If no point inside this outer
bound changes the class label of the input, then no label is changed in the true adversarial
polytope as well. This bound is obtained by solving the following linear program:
z ≥ 0, z ≥ zˆ, −uzˆ + (u − l)z ≤ −ul (52)
Here, u, l , zˆ, z are the lower bound, upper bound, pre ReLU activation and ReLU activation
respectively. Given a dataset (xi ,yi )i=1,2, ...,N , instead of training the model using these data
points, the model is trained using the farthest points (i.e with the highest loss) from xi which
are l∞ by ϵ :
minimizeθ
N∑
i=1
max | |∆ | |∞≤ϵL(fθ (xi + ∆),yi ) (53)
L is the loss function, and θ are the parameters of the feedforward ReLU neural network.
5.2 Comparitive Analysis of Defense Techniques
Similar to the attack section, the defense techniques have now been tested and compared on three
datasets i.e., MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. The results have been compared along the following
dimensions: the attack model on which the defense technique was used, classification accuracy (CA),
which is the accuracy obtained on clean images, attack success rate (ASR), which highlights the
performance of the specific attack model and parameters used. CA and ASR have two subcategories
as well: with defense and without defense which measure the above mentioned metrics with and
without defense techniques. The results have been obtained from the respective research studies.
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Method Attack Model Classification Accuracy Attack Success Rate Specific Parameters Used
Without Defense With Defense Without Defense With Defense
Papernot [46] JSMA [88] 99.51% 99.05% 95.89% 0.45% Temperature T = 100
Hosseini [47] FGSM [37] 99.35% 99.39% 90% 45% α = 0.5, label Smoothing Parameter q = 0.9
Meng [48] FGSM [37] 99.40% 99.10% 8.90% 0% L∞ metric, ϵ = 0.010, epochs = 100, lr = 0.001
I-FGSM [38] 99.40% 99.10% 28% 0% L∞ metric, ϵ = 0.010, epochs = 100, lr = 0.001
Deepfool [89] 99.40% 99.10% 80.90% 0.60% L∞ metric, epochs = 100, lr = 0.001
C&W [32] 99.40% 99.10% 100% 0.20% L∞ metric, epochs = 100, lr = 0.001
Xu [49] FGSM [37] 99.43% 99.28% 46% 8% L∞, Bit Depth Method of 1 bit
C&W [32] 99.43% 99.28% 100% 0% L∞, Bit Depth Method of 1 bit
JSMA [88] 99.43% 99.28% 71% 18% L0 metric, Median Smoothing of 3x3
Buckman [51] FGSM [37] 99.30% 98.67% 100% 3.71% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.3, 40 steps for iterative attacks
PGD/LS-PGA [44] 99.30% 98.67% 100% 5.70% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.3, 40 steps for iterative attacks, ξ = 0.01, δ = 1.2
Samangouie [52] FGSM [37] 99.70% - 71.84% 8.95% ϵ = 0.3, L = 200, R = 10
Kannan [55] PGD [44] - 98.80% - 3.60% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.3, lr = 0.045
Wong [60] FGSM [37] 98.20% 94.18% 50.01% 3.93% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.1
PGD [44] 98.20% 94.18% 81.68% 4.11% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.1
Tramer [61] FGSM [37] - 99.30% 72.80% 14% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.3, lr = 0.045
Madry [83] FGSM [37] 99.20% 98.80% 58.10% 4.40% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.3
PGD [44] 99.20% 98.80% 74% 10.70% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.3, 40 iterations of PGD
Mustafa [66] FGSM [37] 98.71% 99.53% 77% 21.70% epochs = 50, lr = 0.1, ϵ = 0.3
C&W [32] 98.71% 99.53% 79.10% 22.80% c = 10, 1000 iteration steps for C&W
PGD [44] 98.71% 99.53% 88.10% 30.50% 10 iteration steps for PGD with step size ϵ10
Table 9. Defense techniques against attacks on MNIST data set.
Method Attack Model Classification Accuracy Attack Success Rate Specific Parameters Used
Without Defense With Defense Without Defense With Defense
Papernot [46] JSMA [88] 80.95% 81.34% 87.59% 5.11% Temperature T = 100
Meng [48] FGSM [37] 90.60% 86.80% 54% 0.10% L∞ metric, ϵ = 0.050, epochs = 400, lr = 0.001
Iterative [38] 90.60% 86.80% 88.90% 0.10% L∞ metric, ϵ = 0.025, epochs = 400, lr = 0.001
Deepfool [89] 90.60% 86.80% 95.50% 6.60% L∞ metric, epochs = 400, lr = 0.001
C&W [32] 90.60% 86.80% 100% 17% L∞ metric, epochs = 400, lr = 0.001
Xu [49] FGSM [37] 94.84% 89.29% 85% 62% L∞ metric, Median Smoothing of 2x2
C&W [32] 94.84% 89.29% 100% 16% L∞ metric, Median Smoothing of 2x2
Deepfool [89] 94.84% 89.29% 98% 17% L2 metric, Median Smoothing of 2x2
JSMA [88] 94.84% 89.29% 71% 16% L0 metric, Median Smoothing of 2x2
Buckman [51] FGSM [37] 94.29% 87.67% 56.11% 19.04% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.031, 7 steps for iterative attacks
PGD/LS-PGA [44] 94.29% 87.67% 98.34% 20.84% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.031, 7 steps for iterative attacks, ξ = 0.01, δ = 1.2
Dhillon [54] FGSM [37] 89.80% - 30% 22% epochs = 150, Initial lr = 0.5
I-FGSM [38] 89.80% - 40% 15% λ = 1, SAP-100
Song [59] FGSM [37] 92% 88% 89% 76% l∞ metric, ϵattack = 2/8/16, ϵdef end = 16
Deepfool [89] 92% 88% 94% 20% l∞ metric, ϵattack = 2/8/16, ϵdef end = 16
C&W [32] 92% 88% 100% 22% l∞ metric, ϵattack = 2/8/16, ϵdef end = 16
Rakin [63] FGSM [37] 92.11% 84.78% 85.92% 45.96% ϵ = 0.3/1 and ϵ = 8/255 under l2 and l∞ distance respectively
PGD [44] 92.11% 84.78% 100% 54.17% Number of iteration steps is 7 for PGD
Cohen [65] Deepfool [89] 90% 78% 80% 35% l2 metric, α = 0.001, n = 100000
Madry [83] FGSM [37] 95.20% 90.30% 67.30% 4.90% l∞ metric, ϵ = 8
PGD [44] 95.20% 90.30% 96.50% 54.20% l∞ metric, ϵ = 8, 7 steps of size 2 for PGD
Mustafa [66] FGSM [37] 90.80% 90.45% 61% 14.50% epochs = 200, lr = 0.1, ϵ = 0.03
C&W [32] 90.80% 90.45% 68.20% 16.70% c = 0.1, 1000 iteration steps for C&W
PGD [44] 90.80% 90.45% 70.90% 23.60% 10 iteration steps for PGD with step size ϵ10
Table 10. Defense techniques against attacks on CIFAR-10 data set.
Method Attack Model Classification Accuracy Attack Success Rate Specific Parameters Used
Without Defense With Defense Without Defense With Defense
Xu [49] FGSM [37] 69.70% 62.10% 99% 67% L∞ metric, Median Smoothing of 3x3
C&W [32] 69.70% 62.10% 99% 23% L∞ metric, Non Local Means Method (11-3-4)
DeepFool [89] 69.70% 62.10% 89% 28% L2 metric, Median Smoothing of 2x2
Guo [50] FGSM [37] - 75.10% - 29.63% L2 metric
I-FGSM [38] - 75.10% - 28.48% Pixel dropout probability p = 0.5
DeepFool [89] - 75.10% - 28.53% Total Variance minimizer λTV = 0.03
C&W [32] - 75.10% - 29.50% Quilting Patch Size of 5x5
Xie [53] FGSM [37] 100% 97.30% 67% 47.60% l∞ metric, ϵ = 10
DeepFool [89] 100% 97.30% 100% 1.70% l∞ metric, ϵ = 10
C&W [32] 100% 97.30% 100% 3.10% l∞ metric, ϵ = 10
Kannan [55] PGD [44] - - - 72.10% l∞ metric, ϵ = 0.3, lr = 0.045
Prakash [56] FGSM [37] 100% 98.90% 80% 18.50% l2 metric, ϵ = 0.02 − 0.04
I-FGSM [38] 100% 98.90% 85.90% 16.30% Coefficient for BayesShrink, σ = 0.04
DeepFool [89] 100% 98.90% 73.70% 9.70% Window size for pixel deflection, r = 10
JSMA [88] 100% 98.90% 74.50% 3% Number of pixel deflections, K = 100
C&W [32] 100% 98.90% 95.20% 2% ResNet-50 Model
Liao [58] FGSM-White Box [37] 76.70% 75.30% 85.60% 63.30% epochs = 20 to 30, initial lr = 0.001, l∞ metric, ϵ = 4/16
FGSM-Black Box [37] 76.70% 75.30% 59% 43.30% epochs = 20 to 30, initial lr = 0.001, l∞ metric, ϵ = 4/16
Tramer [61] best(FGSM [37], I-FGSM [38], PGD [44]) 80.40% 79.80% 44.40% 27% l∞ metric, ϵ = 16, lr = 0.045
Xie [64] NIPS ’17 CAAD [90] 78.91% 79.08% 100% 50.50% l∞ metric, ϵ = 32, α = 1
Cohen [65] DeepFool [89] 78% 70% 95% 49% l2 metric, α = 0.001, n = 100000
Table 11. Defense techniques against attacks on ImageNet data set.
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Table 9 compares defenses for various attack models on MNIST dataset. Defenses proposed by
Meng et al. [48] and Xu et al. [49] are the only ones for which Attack Success Rate reduces to 0%.
Distillation by Papernot et al. [46] is the defense method with the least reduction in classification
accuracy.
Table 10 shows similar comparison but instead on CIFAR-10 dataset with the following interesting
observations:- 1) MagNet [48] demonstrates maximum robustness among the various defense
techniques for FGSM [37] and I-FGSM [38] attacks. 2) The technique proposed by Mustafa et al.
[66] demonstrates the highest generalizability in terms of classification accuracy.
Table 11 compares defense techniques on ImageNet dataset against various attacks like FGSM
[37], C&W [32], DeepFool [89], PGD [44] e.t.c. Average Attack Success Rates on the ImageNet
dataset are much higher as compared to MNIST and CIFAR-10 even when employing the same
defense techniques. Pixel Deflection by Prakash et al. [56] and Randomization by Xie at al. [53]
have the best generalizability in terms of classification. The models employed by them can get 100%
classification accuracy when not using the defense methods. Also, Pixel Deflection [56] exhibits
the highest robustness in comparison to other methods.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE
Our primary motive behind presenting this study is to encourage the community to push forward
research in the black-box discipline. Analysis of the defense techniques discussed in this study
reveals that the majority of these methods have been tested mostly on white-box adversarial attacks.
To counter the security challenges put forward by the black-box adversaries, defense mechanisms
should also be tested comprehensively on these models to enhance their robustness and applicability
in a large number of scenarios. In addition, all attacks both white-box and black-box focus on
perturbing all the features of the input image. We think that an interesting research direction would
be the detection of non-robust features and exploiting only these features for misclassification.
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